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Toward a Workable Civil Presumptions Rule in Louisiana
A presumption is like the poppy spread
You seize the flower and the bloom is shed
Or like snowfall on the river
A moment seen and then gone forever.'
"Presumptions ... may be looked on as the bats of the law,
flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual
facts." 2
Presumptions are like pitches in the strike zone which place the
batter in peril of striking out, unless he hits a fair ball.'
Like Maeterlinck's male bee, having functioned they disappear. 4
"Presumption" is the slipperiest member of legal terms .. .
I. INTRODUCTION
All of the foregoing similes reveal that for some time now, au-
thorities have experienced difficulty with the perceived ephemeral na-
ture of the evidentiary device known as the presumption, as well as
with its place and effect in a system of rules governing evidence. The
debate has raged unabated and continues today. 6
When Louisiana enacted the Code of Evidence, 7 adopting for the
most part the Federal model,' no provisions on presumption were
Copyright 1993, by LouiSIANA LAw REvraw.
I. Mason Ladd, Presumptions in Civil Actions, 1977 Ariz. St. L.J. 275, 282 (sub-
stituting the word "presumption" for the word "pleasure" in Robert Burns' poem, Tam
O'Shanter).
2. MacKowik v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R. Co., 94 S.W. 256, 262 (Mo. 1906)
(Lamm, J.) (quoting unattributed author).
3. 9 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2491, at 305 n.4
(Chadbourn 1981).
4. Francis H. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the
Burden of Proof, 68 U. Pa. L. Rev. 307, 314 (1920).
5. 2 Charles T. McCormick, Evidence § 342, at 449 (4th ed. 1992).
6. Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 301-01 et seq.
(1991). Particularly note references at 301-14 to 301-15 and the myriad of state rules in
301105]. For a simplistic analysis of the theoretical debate, see Ladd, supra note 1.
7. 1988 La. Acts No. 515, approved July 8, 1988, effective Jan. 1, 1989.
8. George W. Pugh et al., The Louisiana Code of Evidence-A Retrospective and
Prospective View, 49 La. L. Rev. 689 (1989), reprinted from George W. Pugh et al.,
Handbook on Louisiana Evidence Law (1989) [hereinafter Pugh et al., Handbook].
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addressed. Due to pressure on the advisory committee to present their
projet to the legislature, 9 the Louisiana Code of Evidence was left
devoid of treatment of presumptions, as these provisions were "easily
severable" from the remainder of the code, their effect not being
interplayed with the other provisions of the code. However, this time
pressure and its relation to the absence of any provisions on pres-
umptions is a symptom of the real malady: the controversy and
diversity of opinion surrounding presumptions and their evidentiary
effect.' 0
Further, given that there exists no real agreement on presumptions
in the body of evidence law developed under the evidentiary strictures
of the common law, the problem becomes more confounded when
such precepts are applied to a civil law system which regards pres-
umptions as a form of "proof" and which historically contained no
codified evidence law."
This, therefore, is the impetus of this work. What evidentiary rule
should Louisiana formulate which will best solve any theoretical debate
about the nature of presumptions? What rule will yield the best result
in practice? What rule comports with a system which historically
considers presumptions as "proof"? What effect is currently given to
presumptions under the civil law? To attempt an answer could be a
vain exercise, considering the almost one-hundred-year debate that has
existed among common law authorities. 2
This comment will review, in a cursory and perhaps perfunctory
manner, the Louisiana law of presumptions and its origins. Then a
9. Id. at 692.
10. Gerard A. Rault, An Overview of the New Louisiana Code of Evidence-Its
Imperfections and Uncertainties, 49 La. L. Rev. 699, 704 (1989).
11. See Bk. III, Tit. III, Ch. 5 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Specifically note La.
Civ. Code arts. 1849-1852 which state:
Art. 1849. Presumption
A presumption is a consequence that the law or the court attaches to a known
fact for the purpose of establishing the existence of another and unknown fact.
Art. 1850. Presumption established by law
A party whose interest is favored by a presumption established by law need
not offer other proof.
Art. 1851. Proof against a presumption established by law
Legal presumptions are rebuttable or conclusive. A rebuttable legal presump-
tion is established in the interest of private parties and may be controverted.
A conclusive legal presumption is established for reasons of public policy and
may not be controverted.
Art. 1852. Presumption not established by law
A presumption not established by law is left to the discretion of the court.
Unless an allegation of fraud is involved, that presumption may be admitted
only when testimonial proof is admissible.
12. See infra discussion in Part III.
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limited overview of the debate at common law will be provided. This
debate has led to a number of modern views that also will be noted.
Finally, a proposition is offered based on the California Code of
Evidence's treatment of presumptions.
The overviews.given in this comment to Louisiana law and common
law are limited not because further exegesis would not lead to a better
understanding, but rather because this paper could not hope to be
fully comprehensive on these diverse topics. As a result, further elu-
cidation should be garnered by reference to the sources cited herein.
II. PRESUMPTIONS IN LOUISIANA: PREDICTABLE CONFUSION?
The Louisiana law regarding presumptions does not exist in a
system designed to rectify jury shortcomings in treatment of evidence
as the law of presumptions does in the common law. Rather, the
continental legal system which was a "model" for Louisiana law when
first codified found no need for evidentiary rules. Therefore, no body
of comprehensive evidence law was developed in continental countries
such as France, upon which Louisiana law heavily relies in pattern
and substance. The proposed reasons for the failure to develop rules
of evidence are twofold: 1) the civilian methodology, which does not
view litigation at the "heart of any definition of law," and 2) the
combined effect of the absence of juries in civil cases and the "pre-
vailing notion in French law expressed in the principle of 'intime
conviction' of the judges." 3 In a system which is not reliant upon
the function of a jury, common law evidence rules are clearly inap-
posite, even unwarranted.14
Nevertheless, presumptions are created in Louisiana law, their
regulation being a part of the Civil Code's treatment of Proof of
Obligations. 5 Even though one may trace the source of these articles
13. Rene David & Henry P. de Vries, The French Legal System: An Introduction
to Civil Law Systems 73 (1958) ("intime conviction" is translated as "deep-seated con-
viction, devotion").
14. Id.
15. See supra note II. Compare and contrast former La. Civ. Code arts. 2284-2288
(1870):
Art. 2284
Presumptions are consequences which the law or the judge draws from a
known fact to a fact unknown.
Art. 2285
Legal presumption is that which is attached by a special law, to certain acts
or to certain facts; such are:
1. Acts which the law declares null, as presumed to have been made to evade
its provisions, from their very quality.
2. Cases in which the law declares that the ownership or discharge results
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to their counterparts in the Code Napoleon 16 and other sources, such
long-standing rules have not been without confusion." Notably, dis-
tinctions among types of presumptions created by the Code have not
been clearly discernable.'8 Additionally, the vast plethora of statutory
presumptions has only added to the dilemma.' 9
Be that as it may, certain ideas fundamental to presumptions have
substantial clarity. Under Louisiana law, a presumption is defined as
''a consequence that the law or court attaches to a known fact for
the purpose of establishing the existence of another and unknown
fact." 20 Clearly there are two types of presumptions contemplated by
that code definition. One, the legal presumption, is established by law
by specific language of legislation. 2' The Civil Code is a source of
many such legal presumptions.22 The second, the presumption of fact,
which is more commonly described as an inference,23 are those pres-
from certain determinate circumstances.
3. The authority which the law attributes to the thing 2286
The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with respect to what
was the object of the judgment. The thing demanded must be the same; the
demand must be founded on the same cause of action; the demand must be
between the same parties, and formed by them against each other in the same
quality.
Art. 2287
Legal presumption dispenses with all other proof, in favor of him for whom
it exists.
No proof is admitted against the presumption of the law, when, on the
strength of that presumption, it annuls certain acts, or refuses a judicial action,
unless it has reserved the contrary proof, and saving what will be said on the
judicial confession.
Art. 2288
Presumptons, not established by law, are left to the judgment and discretion
of the judge, who ought to admit none but weighty, precise and consistent
presumptions, and only in cases where the law admits testimonial proof, unless
the act be attacked on account of fraud or deceit.
16. See Code Napoleon arts. 1349-1353 (London 1824). See also Vol 16 LSA Civil
Code Comp. Ed. (1973) for a comparison of the different texts.
17. Stephen I. Dwyer, Comment, Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 21 Loy. L.
Rev 377, 395 (1975) (referring to the use of. presumptions in Louisiana as "predictable
confusion"); 6 Dalloz, Repertoire de Droit Civil-Presomptions I (2d ed. 1992).
18. Peter E. Herzog & Martha Werser, Civil Procedure in France 313 (1967).
19. Id. See also Index to Statutory Presumptions in George W. Pugh et al., Handbook,
supra note 8, at 457-61.
20. 1 Saul Litvinoff, Obligations § 12.121, at 410, in 5 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1992). See also La. Civ. Code art. 2279 (1870).
. 21. Litvinoff, supra note 20, § 12.122, at 411. See also 7 Marcel Planiol & Georges
Ripert, Traite Pratique de Droit Civil Francais 1010 (2d ed. 1954 ). An argument could
be made that the language could contemplate those created by jurisprudence constante.
See La. Civ. Code arts. I and 3.
22. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 1890, 2480, 2340.
23. Herzog & Werser, supra note 18, at 313.
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umptions not found in the law but inevitably derived by the mind
from a known fact through logical reasoning. 24
Legal presumptions become binding upon the judge; they are not
discretionary and are meant to be applied strictly without any ex-
pansion or detraction of their scope.25 The Louisiana Civil Code gives
probative force to legal presumptions, and such force is said to relieve
the party in whose favor the presumption operates of the need for
other proof, shifting the burden of proof.26 Legal presumptions, there-
fore, are not "a means of proof ... [but rather] a dispensation of
the need to furnish proof." ' 27 This leads one to the conclusion that
presumptions of this nature, under the experience of the Civil Code,
are not "evidence." They are, rather, an evidentiary device which
relieves a party initially bearing the burden of proof from the burden
as to the presumed fact and places the burden of proof on the opposing
party to prove its nonexistence. Legal presumptions effectively shift
the burden of proof. 2
Further, legal presumptions are either rebuttable or conclusive. 29
Obviously, this means that some presumptions may be contradicted
while others may not. This was the traditional distinction between
presumptions juris tantum and presumptions juris et de jure.30 Those
presumptions juris tantum were allowed to be disproved as such pres-
umptions were only "relative," while those juris et de jure were
"absolute" and irrebuttable.3' However, even this distinction was not
as exacting as it may seem. According to one source, even the absolute
legal presumption could be contradicted by a form of proof which
carried great weight, such as the judicial confession of the party whom
the presumption juris et de jure favored." Nevertheless, some pres-
umptions juris et de jure are accepted as irrefutable, such as the
presumption that the minor was without capacity to contract or the
24. Litvinoff, supra note 20, § 12.125, at 415.
25. Id. § 12.122, at 412-13.
26. La. Civ. Code art. 1850. See also 13 Gabriel G. Baudry-Lacantinerie et al., Traite
Theorique et Pratique de Droit Civil-Des Obligations 947 (2d ed. 1905). See infra text
accompanying notes 53-57.
27. Litvinoff, supra note 20, § 12.123, at 413.
28. Prudhomme v. DeSoto Professional Home Health Serv., 579 So. 2d 1167, 1172
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Thompson v. Woods, 525 So. 2d 174, 177 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1988); Central Bank v. Bishop, 353 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977); Ingram
v. Freeman, 326 So. 2d 565, 567 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 329 So. 2d 755 and
329 So. 2d 757 (1976).
29. La. Civ. Code art. 1851.
30. Litvinoff, supra note 20, § 12.124, at 413-14.
31. Id. See also the discussion in Edouard L. Bonnier, Traite Theorique et Pratique
des Preuves en Droit Civil et en Droit Criminel 688-90 (2d ed. 1852).
32. Planiol & Ripert, supra note 21, at 1013-14.
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implied error when a party has sold a thing for a lesionary price."
However, this categorization was sometimes erroneously applied.34
Additionally, some presumptions not founded in express law were
considered juris et de jure by the courts.3 This was the result of the
court's interpretation of Article 2287 of the Louisiana Civil Code of
1870.36 The revision sought to clarify the rule with a line demarcating
the rebuttable presumption from the conclusive. 7 Thus, according to
Article 1851, "[a] rebuttable legal presumption is established in the
interest of private parties and may be controverted," whereas "[a]
conclusive legal presumption is established for reasons of public policy
and may not be controverted." It becomes obvious that courts, al-
though they may rely to some degree on past interpretations, will now
need to clarify and delineate presumptions accordingly. Notably, those
presumptions which are wholly irrebuttable take their place as part
of the substantive law.3"
As a further complication, the Louisiana jurisprudence has made
additional distinction between presumptions which may be rebutted
freely and those which may be rebutted only by clear and convincing
evidence.3 9 The courts appear to be admitting to a weighing of policy
considerations when they judge the effect of a particular presumption.
Presumptions of fact, on the other hand, are left to the discretion
of the court. 40 Formerly, the Civil Code allowed for only those pres-
umptions of fact, inferences if you will, to be admitted which were
"weighty, precise and consistent." ' 4' This is probably still correct but
now impliedly left to judicial function.4 2
33. Litvinoff, supra note 20, § 12.124, at 415. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
158 La. 137, 103 So. 537 (1925).
34. See, e.g., Gillies v. Gillies, 144 So. 2d 893 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (noting that
the presumption of paternity is juris et de jure, yet susceptible to contrary proof).
35. See, e.g., Barnett v. Barnett, 339 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), writ ref.,
341 So. 2d 1127 (1977) (relying on the absence of a double declaration to hold that the
presumption of community is conclusive); Rhodus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 192 So. 2d 226
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 250 La. 101, 194 So. 2d 99 (1966) (holding that the
presumption that "a person saw a thing he should have seen had he looked" is a juris
et de jure presumption).
36. See supra note 15.
37. Litvinoff, supra note 20, § 12.130, at 419. See La. Civ. Code art. 1850.
38. Herzog & Werser, supra note 18, at 316.
39. Litvinoff, supra note 20, § 12.125, at 415. See, e.g., Succession of Hamiter, 573
So. 2d 584, 585 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (testamentary capacity); Creditthrift of America
No. 2, Inc. v. Jackson, 571 So. 2d 168, 169 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (sheriff's return
of service is prima facie correct); Dance v. Dance, 552 So. 2d 658, 662 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1989) (presumption of community under La. Civ. Code art. 2340).
40. La. Civ. Code art. 1951.
41. La. Civ. Code art. 2288 (1870).
42. La. Civ. Code art. 1952.
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As we have thus noted, legal presumptions are not a means of
proof but rather a relief from the burden of proof. Presumptions of
fact, on the other hand, are considered a "veritable means of proof
• . . [and] [w]hen justified ... are entitled to as much weight as any
other means of proof. '43 This, of course, does not evince their place
as "evidence" in a common law scheme, only their place as "proof
to be weighed" in a civilian system.
This is, in brief, the background upon which we now set forth
to propose a reasoned rule for presumptions in the Louisiana Code
of Evidence.
III. PRESUMPTIONS IN COMMON LAW: THE GLADIATORS ENTER THE
RING
As noted in the introduction, the rules and theories about pres-
umptions in the common law of evidence are unsettled, perhaps even
perverse. Take the example of Stanley's words, "Dr. Livingston, I
presume." Before we could ever decide upon a theory of evidentiary
effect to be given to this conversational presumption, we must en-
deavor to know what is meant by "presume." ' 44 Standing in Stanley's
shoes, is it "Dr. Livingston, the law has concluded, or the law only
rebuttably presumes?" Or, "Dr. Livingston, I infer?" "I assume?"
Do I surmise? Conject? Is it based on reason or probability? Must
I infer? Were there sufficient basic facts warranting such a conclusion?
Were there any facts controverting the presumption? And if the answer
to this last question is "yes," may I no longer presume? Presumptions,
unfortunately, are "a subject on which text writers, teachers of law,
and authors of legal articles have written much and clarified little. ' 45
A recapitulation of the myriad works and cases would be useless
as they do not provide a singular understanding and would occupy
the reader's time needlessly. In the alternative, therefore, the following
is a terse and cogent summary of the basic tenets of what has evolved
into two main conflicting theories. The reader is invited to expand
this further if desired. 46
43. Litvinoff, supra note 20, § 12.125, at 416, relying on Truxillo v. Texas & Pacific
R.R. Co., 7 Orl. App. 18 (La. App. 1909).
44. Remember, even under civilian theory, presumptions were of at least two types.
The diversity is no less at common law.
45. Te Poel v. Larson, 53 N.W.2d 468, 470 (1952) (citations omitted).
46. Edmund M. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 34-44 (1961); Edmund M.
Morgan, Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo-American System of Litigation 74-
81 (1956); Wigmore, supra note 3, §§ 2490-2493; Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil
Actions Reconsidered, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 843 (1981); Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions,
Inferences and Burden of Proof in Federal Civil Actions-An Anatomy of Unnecessary
1993]
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Presumptions are "universally agreed" to be "a rule of law which
requires that the existence of a fact (presumed fact) be taken as
established when another fact or other facts (basic facts) are estab-
lished, unless and until a certain specified condition is fulfilled. ' 47
This definition leads to two conclusions. First, it does not com-
prehend the so called "conclusive presumption." The definition re-
quires that a presumption may be overcome upon the happening of
the specified condition. This is logically due to the notion that a
"presumption" which may not be rebutted does not take on the
character of an evidentiary rule, rather it is a matter of substantive
law. 4 As such, under the common law of evidence, conclusive pres-
umptions are properly distinguished from the rules affecting evidentiary
presumptions. Second, such a definition does not include within its
scope the logical inference, that is, the "presumption of fact. ' 49 Such
inferences are not rules of evidence law but rather the "rational
potency or probative value of the evidentiary fact[,] . . . mere ar-
guments . . . depend[ing] upon their own natural force and efficacy
in generating belief or conviction in the mind."50 As one author noted,
"The compulsive effect of an inference, if it has any, is based entirely
upon logic and experience, not upon law." 5'
Accepting that, for the purposes of an evidentiary rule in common
law, the above definition adequately describes the true theoretical
definition of a presumption, the majority of the debate has centered
upon the effect of such a presumption when the presumed fact is
beset upon by contradictory evidence.
There are, as said before, two basic theories at issue, each dealing
with the effect to be given a non-conclusive presumption at law. The
first, known as the "bursting bubble" theory, is attributed to James
Bradley Thayer. 2 This theory, adopted by Wigmore," basically pro-
Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform, 76 Nw. U. L. Rev. 892 (1982); Bohlen, supra
note 4; Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity,
12 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1959); Alfred L. Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5
Vand. L. Rev. 324 (1952); Ladd, supra note 1.
47. 2 Michael H. Graham, Modern State and Federal Evidence: A Comprehensive
Reference Text 786 (1989). Compare the text of La. Civ. Code art. 1849.
48. See generally Litvinoff, supra note 20, § 12, at 410-27. See also Wigmore, supra
note 3, § 2492, at 308; McCormick, supra note 5, § 342, at 451; Gausewitz, supra note
46, at 326; Graham, supra note 47, at 796.
49. See Litvinoff, supra note 20. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2491, at 304; Gausewitz,
supra note 46, at 326. Graham, supra note 47, at 796.
50. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2491, at 304 (in part, quoting from Simon Greenleaf,
Evidence § 44 (1842)).
51. Gausewitz, supra note 46, at 327.
52. See James B. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law
(1898).
53. Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2491(2), at 305.
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poses that the effect of a presumption, as defined earlier, is to shift
the burden to produce evidence upon the presumed fact from the one
originally cast with that burden.' 4 Upon introduction of evidence con-
troverting the presumed fact, the presumption disappears, "without
regard to whether the evidence is actually believed,"" and without
regard, therefore, to the degree of controverting evidence. Thus:
A presumption under the Thayer "bursting bubble" approach
is thus a procedural device that shifts the burden of producing
evidence. Once a party has sufficiently established the basic
facts that give rise to the presumption, the opponent must
produce evidence to rebut the presumed fact or else, depending
upon the nature of the fact presumed, either a verdict will be
directed on the element or the jury will be instructed to find
in favor of the presumed fact. If evidence is introduced suf-
ficient to support a finding by a reasonable trier of fact
contrary to the existence of the presumed fact, the presumption
is rebutted and has no further effect at the trial. . . . [Only]
the natural inference, if any, which flows from the basic facts
remains to be considered. 6
The end result is that the burden of persuasion is permanently
cast upon the party who initially bore it; merely the burden
of producing evidence has been shifted. 7
This view was greatly criticized for its "arbitrary and unreason-
able" assignment of "so slight and evanescent procedural effect to
every presumption."'" Although criticized, the theory has been incor-
porated in the Model Code of Evidence and the Federal Rules of
Evidence.' 9
The second theory, known as the Morgan theory, attempts to give
efficacy to the variant policies behind the creation of presumption of
law since, in many instances, these policies "may be just as strong
as those that govern the allocations of burdens of proof .... ,,6o This
theory provides that
54. McCormick, supra note 5, § 344, at 462.
55. Graham, supra note 47, at 787.
56. Id. at 787-88.
57. Id.
58. Edmund M. Morgan & John M. Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at
Evidence, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 913 (1937). See also Gausewitz, supra note 46, at 342.
59. Model Rules of Evidence 704(2) (1942). Fed. R. Evid. 301. See Weinstein &
Berger, supra note 6, at 301-1 to 301-14.
60. McCormick, supra note 5, § 344, at 463. Morgan enumerated seven policies:
1. To make unnecessary the introduction of evidence upon an issue made by
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[I]f the basic facts (A) are established, the jury is instructed
that it must find the presumed fact (B) unless and until the
proponent persuades the trier of fact that the nonexistence of
fact (B) is more probably true than not true. 6'
The Uniform Rules of Evidence adopted such an approach to pres-
umptions, as did the Supreme Court's draft of the Federal Rules of
Evidence .62
But this theory also is not without its critics. Basically, the criticism
extends from the complexity in instructing the jury and the confusing
terminology regarding what is actually a presumption under the rule
and what policy its creation was based upon. 63
Thus, neither theory has gained preeminence. Difficulties in both
have caused the states to adopt a number of differing approaches.
Additionally, scholars have proposed a few more variant approaches.
One suggestion has been to divorce the evidentiary law of presumptions
from the burden of persuasion and replace it with a revised system
of pleadings, a "process of allocating the elements of a case between
parties in the form of prima facie case, affirmative defense, etc ..... 64
Of course this would lead to other difficulties, probably greater than
the difficulties it proposes to rid. 65 Another theory has advocated
eliminating use of the term "presumption," but in the face of its
prevalent use by courts, this theory is too reliant on an effort which
could never be made a reality.66
Neither of the two main theories is without its intellectual dilemma,
but the Morgan theory has at least one major strong point. It compels
one to reject the Thayer approach, as the Thayer theory gives no
the pleadings but not likely to be the subject of serious dispute....
2. To avoid a procedural impasse in a situation where evidence as to the presumed
fact is lacking....
3. To avoid such an impasse created by the impossibility of securing legally
competent evidence of the presumed fact....
4. To produce a result in accord with the preponderance of probability....
5. To require the party having peculiar means of access to the facts and evidence
of the facts to make them known to the court....
6. To reach a result deemed socially desirable wherever the basic facts exist....
7. To reach a result deemed more desirable for a combination of two or more
of the foregoing reasons.
Morgan, supra note 46, at 32-33.
61. Graham, supra note 47, at 791.
62. Weinstein & Berger, supra note 6, at 301-1 to 301-3.
63. McCormick, supra note 5, at 463-64; Graham, supra note 47, at 794.
64. Cleary, supra note 46, at 21.
65. Wigmore, supra note 3, §§ 2485-2486.
66. Allen, supra note 46. See the criticism contained in Kenneth S. Broun, The
Unfulfillable Promise of One Rule for All Presumptions, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 697, 707 (1984).
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treatment to the underlying policies of presumptions, something we
noted earlier which permeates their legislative enactment. 67
IV. THE CALIFORNIA MODEL: AN ATTEMPT AT THE BEST OF BOTH
WORLDS
In 1965, as the culmination of a thirty-year debate, California
adopted a new evidence code. 6a The California Code of Evidence
adopted a new approach, one which sought to overcome the weaknesses
of the Thayer and Morgan approaches while combining portions of
each system. The system chosen, in effect, is a codification of the
criticisms offered by Professor Bohlen of the University of Pennsyl-
vania in 1920.69 In essence, Professor Bohlen averted to the realization
that even where courts were stating that they adhered to the Thayer
theory, they did not in practice follow the doctrine to which they
claimed adherence. Since all presumptions are "created by some policy
of law which requires . . . abnormal weight to be given [to the basic
facts] to meet some judicially felt need or to accomplish some purpose
judicially recognized as desirable," then, as stated by Professor Boh-
len, "the force of each presumption and its effect, as shifting the
burden of overcoming the inertia of the court or of only shifting the
burden of producing evidence, depends upon the nature of the need
or purpose which has led to the recognition of that presumption. ' 70
i The California Code of Evidence, therefore, treats presumptions
in a pluralistic manner.7 ' It divides the subject matter into three
67. See supra notes 59-60.
68. 1965 Cal. Stat. c. 299, § 600 et seq. For a history of the debate, see Wigmore,
supra note 3, § 2493(i), at 341-42. See also John R. McDonough, The California Evidence
Code: A Precis, 18 Hast. L.J. 89 (1966).
69. Bohlen, supra note 4. See Wigmore, supra note 3, § 2493(b).
70. Bohlen, supra note 4, at 313.
71. The pertinent provisions read as follows:
§ 600. Presumption and inference defined
(a) A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made
from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action.
A presumption is not evidence.
(b) An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be
drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in
the action.
§ 601. Classification of presumptions
A presumption is either conclusive or rebuttable. Every rebuttable presumption
is either (a) a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence or (b)
a presumption affecting the burden of proof.
§ 602. Statute making one fact prima facie evidence of another fact
A statute providing that a fact or group of facts is prima facie evidence of
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categories: conclusive presumptions, rebuttable presumptions, and in-
ferences.7 2 It then divides the procedural effect according to the un-
derlying motivation in the creation of the presumption. The
determination of whether a rebuttable presumption is established for
reasons of policy or for the benefit of a party is not left to the
court. 73
V. CAN LOUISIANA LAW COMPORT WITH A CALIFORNIA MODEL?
When comparing the Louisiana Civil Code provisions on pres-
umptions with the California Code of Evidence, one is immediately
struck with certain conceptual similarities. California extracts infer-
ences from presumptions just as the Louisiana Civil Code treats pres-
umptions of fact differently from presumptions of law. The California
model provides that conclusive presumptions of law are irrebuttable,
just as Louisiana holds that they may not be controverted. Then the
California Code divides those presumptions which may be rebutted
into two categories: those created for public policy and those which
are made in the interest of a party. At this point, the California Code
would seem to run afoul of the Louisiana Civil Code, which has
established that rebuttable presumptions are created in the interest of
another fact establishes a rebuttable presumption.
§ 603. Presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence defined
A presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is a presumption
established to implement no public policy other than to facilitate the determi-
nation of the particular action in which the presumption is applied.
§ 604. Effect of presumption affecting burden of producing evidence
The effect of a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence is
to require the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless
and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its nonex-
istence, in which case the trier of fact shall determine the existence or non-
existence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the
presumption. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the drawing
of any inference that may be appropriate.
§ 605. Presumption affecting the burden of proof defined
A presumption affecting the burden of proof is a presumption established to
implement some public policy other than to facilitate the determination of the
particular action in which the presumption is applied, such as the policy in
favor of the establishment of a parent and child relationship, the validity of
marriage, the stability of titles to property, or the security of those who entrust
themselves or their property to the administration of others.
§ 606. Effect of presumption affecting burden of proof
The effect of a presumption affecting the burden of proof is to impose upon
the party against whom it operates the burden of proof as to the nonexistence
of the presumed fact.
Cal. Evid. Code §§ 600-606 (West 1966 & Supp. 1993).
72. Compare with La Civ. Code arts. 1849-1852.
73. See comment to Cal. Evid. Code § 602 (West 1966 & Supp. 1993).
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the parties and conclusive presumptions are created for policy reasons.
However, it must be remembered that this is only a generalization.
There are obviously variant policies behind rebuttable legal presump-
tions in Louisiana law. In fact, if one were to compare those pres-
umptions considered by the California Code of Evidence to be created
for reasons of public policy 7 4 one realizes that they substantially
comport to rebuttable presumptions recognized by the Louisiana law.
The difference is that the public policy addressed in Louisiana Civil
Code article 1851 is the strongest of policies, admitting no contrary
evidence and established for the greater good or public order. All
rebuttable presumptions in Louisiana law, though created for the
interest of the parties, have an underlying policy as to why the law
would give such a party an interest. Therefore, the California model
is adaptable.
VI. THE PROPOSAL OF A LOUISIANA RULE
To avoid duplication of definitions, a Louisiana rule need merely
reference the Civil Code provisions. Additionally, the rule will have
to delineate that rebuttable presumptions under Louisiana law are
created for various policy reasons, the procedural effect being deter-
mined by what policy the presumption was created to further, in
addition to the fact that it was created in the interest of a particular
party. A proposed rule could be:
a. A presumption is not evidence.
b. Every rebuttable presumption is either:
(1) a presumption affecting the burden of producing ev-
idence, or;
(2) a presumption affecting the burden of persuasion.
c. A statute providing that a fact or group of facts is prima
facie evidence of another fact establishes a rebuttable pre-
sumption.
d. A presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence
is a presumption established to implement no public policy
other than to facilitate the determination of the particular
action in which the presumption is applied.
e. The effect of a presumption affecting the burden of pro-
ducing evidence is to require the trier of fact to assume the
74. See Cal. Evid. Code §§ 620-624 (West 1966 & Supp. 1993).
1993l
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
existence of the presumed fact unless and until evidence is
introduced which would support a finding of its nonexistence,
in which case the trier of fact shall determine the existence
or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and
without regard to the presumption. Nothing in this section
shall be construed to prevent the drawing of any inference
that may be appropriate.
f. A presumption affecting the burden of persuasion is a
presumption established to implement some public policy other
than to facilitate the determination of the particular action in
which the presumption is applied.
g. The effect of a presumption affecting the burden of proof
is to impose upon the party against whom it operates the
burden of proof as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact.
This rule is an incomplete copy of the California model. Merely
the definitions have been omitted, since Louisiana's definitions are
contained in the Civil Code. The key to effecting the proposed article
is to understand that shifting the burden of proof and shifting the
burden of persuasion are fundamentally distinct concepts. The burden
of proof simply requires the opposing party to go forward with suf-
ficient evidence to enable reasonable minds to conclude that the pre-
sumed fact does not exist. When the burden of production is met,
the court may then instruct the jury that it may, but is not required
to, infer the existence of the presumed fact. The burden of persuasion
requires the opponent to persuade the trier of fact, who must now
take the presumed fact as established, that the probability of its
existence is less than the degree of persuasion required by the particular
action. This means that the opposing party now bears the burden of
persuasion not as regards the presumed fact, but facts which tend to
cause a trier of fact not to find for the proponent.
As a further requirement, Louisiana courts would have to examine
the classifications already made to presumptions existing in Louisiana
law to determine what effect to ascribe to each.
VII. CONCLUSION
If we accept that there must be given to presumptions some greater
effect in some cases than merely to require a party opposing a pre-
sumption to come forward with some evidence to the contrary, we
need to create a rule quite different from the federal model. California
has made a reasoned attempt. Louisiana courts, which have wrestled
with presumptions for hundreds of years, should have no problem
applying such a rule. The rule will serve to implement the legislative
intent behind the sundry presumptions prescribed. The remaining ques-
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tion? Are the court's determinations of which rebuttable legal pres-
umptions are created for greater public policy reviewable?
Geoffrey J. Orr

